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The article considers the long-standing limits of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) through the lenses 
of Next Generation EU (NGEU) pandemic response evidencing how Covid-19 exacerbated EMU shortcomings 
are (not) overcome. We evaluate whether NGEU is only a palliative stop-gap fix to structural problems and 
how for Covid-19 to be considered as a breaking point for EU economic governance permanent ambitious 
(Treaty) reform is an essential and so far not uncontested step. A qualitative systematic review of 
weaknesses of EMU and proposed reforms informs a scoreboard evaluation of NGEU. Results confirm that 
while the symmetric crisis allowed suspending risk-sharing and solidarity vetoes, deep structural 
asymmetries and unfitness of (intergovernmental) decision-making cannot be addressed through NGEU 
temporary emergency mechanism. Hence Covid-19 so far cannot be narrated as sparking a revolutionary 
deviation from the architecture and guiding principle of the supranational fiscal framework. At the same 
time, the pandemic opened a (short-lived) window of opportunity for completing the EMU, requiring 
permanent structural institutional (Treaty) reform. A timely finding – grounded in copious extant literature 
on the EMU – highlighting the high stakes of the ongoing Conference of the future of Europe, whose success 
can only materialise through an ambitious (federal) agenda. 
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1. Introduction:  
  
The analysis assesses the progress and prospects for the Economic and Monetary Union through the lenses 
of the Covid-19 response. We consider improvements enacted by the crisis-response instrument and evidence 
the extent to which they fail short of reform needs highlighted within the extant literature. The research 
analyses how the new Next Generation EU pandemic recovery effort overcomes the Covid-19-exacerbated 
EMU shortcomings. With the current EU economic governance framework as a reference point, the aim is to 
identify the progress in terms of the input\output legitimacy of the supranational infrastructure and in turn the 
remaining gaps and what reforms would be required to fulfil them. Considering recent developments in the 
context of the broader academic and policy debate on EMU and EU reform, the analysis highlights the impact 
of the pandemic on prospects for further European integration presenting stakes for the Conference on the 
Future of Europe (CoFoE) and the long-term developments needed for fiscal policy within the Eurozone. 
 
EMU has been the target of extensive criticism since its introduction and early phases, not subsiding after 
the two reform waves. Its ability to deliver in ensuring fiscal restraint and providing for stabilisation has been 
questioned, especially in times of crisis. The reform debate precedes Covid-19 which has further grown its 
salience and urgency. The pandemic has exacerbated and ulteriorly evidenced the weaknesses of EMU whose 
key components were quickly shelved as impediments to the crisis response, followed by long and divisive 
negotiations of emergency measures to fill the gaps of a blatantly unfit EU economic governance framework 
which in the midst of such a human and economic tragedy further confirm the (intergovernmental) institutional 
failures. Alike in the Eurozone crisis, the attention of the political elite and public opinion on EMU is 
heightened. Conversely, the narrative cannot be framed in terms of blame on countries in need given the 
symmetric nature of the health emergency Hence the top-down and bottom up pressure for transnational 
solidarity is unprecedented in parallel with risk sharing measures such as NGEU and SURE.  
 
Rather than coming to the conclusion that the evolutions amounts to a breaking point from the errors of the  
past, we assess such mainstream claim by leveraging the copious literature on the limits and fundamental 
shortcomings of EMU and lessons from the Euro. Under the guiding question of the appropriateness of the 
institutional arrangements and policy instruments in carrying out the stated objectives, a systematic review of 
SGP weaknesses, encoded through (qualitative) text analysis, inform a scoreboard of indicators capturing input 
and output legitimacy shortcomings of the fiscal component of EMU. The scoreboard evaluates the pre- and 
post-Covid EU economic governance performance. The analysis of the proposed reforms compiles a parallel 
scoreboard of EMU ideal type(s) through SWOT analysis of the envisaged policy alternatives. Benchmarking 
Next Generation EU against the scoreboard of EMU weaknesses allows to address the research question of the 
extent to which existing gaps are compensated by the pandemic-lead expansion of the EU joint toolset. From 
such a perspective, NGEU emerges as far from a resolutive revolution per se. While the pandemic offers a 
window of opportunity unthinkable ahead of the crisis, the results highlight how the woes of EU economic 
governance are structural and deeply enshrined in the institutional architecture of EMU, constraining national 
sovereignties and budgets without complementing such void supranationally. NGEU, a temporary addition to 
such framework which does not alter its essence, appear at most as a stop-gap measures. The policy implication 
is that – as the demand for permanent stabilisation and solidarity mechanisms has so far emerged as far from 
consensual – Covid-19 will be a critical juncture for integration only insofar as ambitious structural reforms 










2. Literature review 
 
The European Monetary Union (EMU) and the European Union integration process are a unicum in history: 
for the first time, after two World Wars, Europeans decided to pool their energies and will to build a single 
space of peace and prosperity. Since the very beginning of the integration process, an “ever closer union”, 
under explicit federal intentions, was a primary ideal landmark (Schuman, 1950). Certainly, EMU is among 
the most tangible element of European integration, nevertheless, is far from complete after two major stress-
tests: the Sovereign debt crisis and, nowadays, the Covid-19 outbreak. 
 
Such crises undermine trust for the EU. According to Scharpf, input legitimacy needs a strong identity to be 
fully implemented, traditionally linked with National democracies (Scharpf 1999). Output legitimacy is based 
on interests and outcomes. That is closer to the strongpoints of the European Union which permits to deliver 
“policies for the people”, addressing very specific matters, guaranteeing solid responsiveness (Scharpf 1999). 
The two dimensions, input legitimacy and output legitimacy, in the recent developments of European 
integration are somehow intertwined: the European Parliament has been largely involved in budgetary matters 
(Alcidi et al. 2014), but, at the same time, informal mechanisms have been favoured by circumstances in ruling 
EMU, predominantly after the Sovereign debt crisis (Puetter 2016). 
 
EMU has been governed intensively, by non-formal rules instead of the Treaties itself (Puetter 2016). In 
particular after the Sovereign debt crisis, informal institutions multiplied. Reasons are twofold: the reluctancy 
to cede or share sovereignty in areas of core state powers and the incompleteness of EMU itself (Louis 2016). 
As much as the “sanctuary of sovereignty” has been touched, the deliberative intergovernmentalism has been 
practically implemented for example through the centrality of the Eurogroup (Puetter 2015). Consequences 
for input legitimacy have been particularly visible throughout Europe. 
 
If in normal times, output legitimacy has been considered sufficient for EMU related decisions, during the 
crisis such mechanism has been altered. Austerity policies, tough decision towards Greece, the inability 
(especially before the creation of EFSF and ESM) of EMU to intervene in emergencies and overcome its 
contradictions (i.e. incompleteness) created an explicit crisis of effectiveness. If legitimacy at European level 
needs to be measured against the ability to reduce possible conflicts among the actors and guarantee optimal 
output (Scharpf 1999; Majone 1996), the Greek and the overall sovereign debt crisis demonstrated that such 
mechanism need to be rebalanced. 
 
Both the Sovereign debt crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic undermined not just the popularity of EMU but 
of the overall European project. In some countries (even among the founding Member States), Euroscepticism 
grew and the EU struggled to find a way to be (not just to be perceived as) an effective actor for the citizenry. 
Beyond the issue of legitimacy multiple concerns have been risen on the shortcomings of the EU economic 
governance framework especially in the context of the Euro crisis. The original sin of centralised monetary 
policy and (rule-constrained) decentralised fiscal policy (Heipertz and Verdun 2020; Thirion 2017) ties the 
hands of a prompt common response in times of need. With the intergovernmental nature of the decision-
making process within the economic arena further slowing and hindering a prompt and adequate fiscal 
response, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is blamed for hampering the recovery from the Great Recession 
contributing to the onset of the Euro Crisis while furthering core-periphery divergence (Heise 2015; Wyplosz 
2017; De Grauwe and Ji 2018; Howarth and Verdun 2020). In the absence of any substantial change to the 








sovereignty without a parallel supranational replacement, the weaknesses of the framework survive today 
through the major policy overhaul in the aftermath of the Euro crisis (De Grauwe and Ji 2018; Jones et al., 
2016).  
 
In this context the Euro-crisis offers precious insights for the dynamics of the pandemic crisis-management 
and their implication for the derived EU response instruments. In parallel with the past, the initial (common) 
pandemic response occurred through piecemeal small-scale initiatives, on one side, while the most substantial 
interventions relied at the supranational level on the monetary channel through the Pandemic Emergency 
Purchase Programme of the ECB and the freeing of national fiscal policies by the invocation of the general 
escape clause of the SGP (ECB 2020; EUCO 2020a). In this context fits the four month long negotiation 
resulting in the July political agreement over Next Generation EU (EUCO 2020b) which only after a further 
four month achieved agreement of a common position within the Council (2020). While the scale and the 
nature of the instrument are undoubtedly unprecedented, mobilising half of its 750 billions through grants 
financed by common borrowing (EUCO 2020b), it remains an open question the extent to which NGEU 
represents a true revolution fixing the woes of EMU or rather a temporary stop-gap measure opening the door 
for further trouble unless a permanent solution can be fast agreed and put into place. 
 
3. Analytical framework and methodology 
 
On such a basis, the work analyses systematically the extant literature on the EMU and the crisis uncovering 
the major themes and shortcomings of the governance framework. The objective is to assess the extent to 
which novel instruments such as NGEU fill the structural problems of EU economic governance. In doing so 
we test the hypotheses, delineated as follow:  
 
H1 The introduction of NGEU is a palliative fix failing to tackle the entrenched imbalances of EMU 
 
H2 Covid-19 may be considered as a breaking point overcoming EMU shortcomings only if the 
governance undergoes permanent structural reform  
 
The hypotheses expand a well-established body of literature to the novel case of NGEU. On one side they 
are grounded on extensive work dedicated to EMU and its failure especially in the context of crisis-
management, while on the other of the reform proposals put forward within the literature. On both accounts 
problems – ahead of their formal identification through the systematic review – appear as deeply ingrained 
within the governance architecture. From such a perspective, temporary emergency measures can be 
reasonably expected to hardly represent a systemic solution. Against this backdrop, the collective body of 
literature on these topics provides the foundation for the data collection as illustrated below. 
 
3.1 Data collection through a systematic review 
 
The key weaknesses of the EMU economic governance highlighted within the literature are identified 
following the methodological approach of qualitative systematic reviews (Booth 2016). Such an approach 
allows to mitigate the risk of bias in surveying the field, while at the same time providing event in a qualitative 
context a clear indication of the prevalence of specific diagnoses of the problems connected with the EU 
economic governance framework within the literature, as well as regarding the proposed solutions. As such 








which NGEU tackles open challenges and is aligned with the optimal course for economic integration 
highlighted within the field. The protocol for the systematic review is devised in view of such objectives, in 
line with the standard of the PRISMA guidelines (e.g.  Moher et al. 2009; Shamseer et al. 2015) indicating 
below our approach for all the essential elements of the process (questions, sources, selection, appraisal and 
synthesis).  
 
Building on our preliminary literature review, the guiding questions for the identification of the search 
keywords and the selection process in alignment with the research questions of the analysis concern (i) the 
appropriateness of institutional arrangements and mechanisms for policy objectives; (ii)  the framework’s 
performance for input and output legitimacy; (iii) adverse effects caused by EMU and its shortcoming and (iv) 
proposed policy reforms. 
 
Within the timeframe starting from 2015, the search perimeter is defined by keywords pertaining to EMU 
and its components (Stability and Growth Pact, Excessive Deficit Procedure; six-pack; two pack; European 
Semester; Fiscal Compact), as well as the Euro crisis and EMU reform and specific reform proposals 
(Eurobonds; fiscal union). In addition, alternative wordings and abbreviations are added to the keywords to 
provide for an inclusive starting reference list. The search is carried out through Scopus, with a preliminary 
screening of language (limited to English, Italian, French, German and Spanish) and subject areas (excluding, 
for example, medicine, natural sciences, etc.) in order to eliminate overtly irrelevant entries either because of 
their content or accessibility.  
 
The process of selection is then carried out by the two authors independently, each taking the role of primary 
coder for half of the sample, verifying the selection decision for the remaining half. After the initial screening 
the eligibility is confirmed in light of the relevance for either the broad areas of EMU weaknesses or/and 
reform proposals, in adherence with the guiding questions identified above. The included records are then 
coded alike for their initial selection by the authors through qualitative text analysis of the abstract and author 
keywords, completed by additional inspection of the full-text article when abstract are absent or insufficient in 
providing clear indication of results. In the coding of the review-tags the number of citations, provided by 
Scopus, is used as an appraisal criterium (Dixon-Woods et al. 2004) for the inclusion of new tags, taking as 
well into account the recency of the literature. For what concerns synthesis, the context of the analysis implies 
that rather than a summary of the systematic review our purpose is to use such output (e.g. keywords associated 
with the selected literature) as an input for the scoreboard. As a result, the systematic review inform the analysis 
in two ways: weighting the relevance of  given themes through the prevalence of the review-tags and guiding 
back once such tags have been hierarchically structured in main themes and subcomponents to the original 
claims of the authors so that their synthesis can outline  the weaknesses and the reform proposals put forwards 
in the literature. The coded selected articles are exported as a bibtext collection from Mendeley, converted into 
a csv and constitutes the main dataset for the analysis. 
 
3.2 From keywords to scoreboards 
  
Scoreboards have multiplied over the year in the context of EU policies, spanning with those with a long 
history such as the Internal Market Scoreboard, the DESI (Digital Economy and Society Index) and other of 
more recent introduction as the EU Justice Scoreboard, that connected with the European Pillar or Social Rights 
or the one associated with the evaluation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans. Many rely on the 








et al. 2008). Even in such context, the strength of the scoreboard relies quite importantly on a sound selection 
of indicators. In this instance such step is grounded on the systematic literature review and the derived code-
tags, which are quantified on the basis of their frequency.  
 
Hence, scoreboard criteria are defined on the basis of the literature-derived review-tags within each arena. 
The challenge is reducing observations consisting of each tag associated to the selected articles into an effective 
hierarchy of topics characterising weaknesses and reform proposals. Frequency analysis is the initial step in 
the process, allowing to identify and structure the key themes. From a scoreboard perspective this serves the 
purpose of justifying the indicator selection, which is hence linked to the relevance within the field. From the 
main dataset the coded-tags are extracted. The output is two-fold: a visual representation of the keywords word 
cloud and a frequency table. Through both we present how often the given coded-tags emerge within the 
selected articles, an element supporting the choice of the most relevant indicators against which to score NGEU 
advances and gaps. Code-tags are pre-processed substituting spaces with dashes so that those containing 
multiple words (e.g. sovereign-debt-crisis) are not erroneously split in the process of the text analysis. No 
ulterior text cleaning is performed as the corpus consist of keywords deployed by researchers. Hence, keywords 
exclusion are, for example, not stemmed which would hinder their presentation without any benefit to the 
analysis. The processed code-tags are then loaded as the corpus generating frequency table indicating how 
often each code-tag emerges within the corpus and its visual representation in a word cloud.1  
 
Out of such analysis of the most frequent keywords, the indicators of the scoreboard are devised according 
to the hierarchical linkages of the concepts of the predominant tags. That is to say that from the organise the 
top keywords into (i) high-level topics (e.g. austerity) and (ii) main subtopics (e.g. balanced budget rules; 
Fiscal Compact; Euro-crisis). Finally we connect the sub-topics to the main groupings they are logically linked 
to within the academic debate. The output is partially divergent across weaknesses and proposals. On 
weaknesses the output is the systematic classification of their characteristics, against which to score the extent 
to which they may or may not be mitigated in addressing H1. In addition to their classification a further step 
is undertaken for EMU reform: the proposals are considered critically through a SWOT analysis in order to 
highlight the ideal type(s) of governance frameworks and their key characteristics in overcoming current 
weaknesses. Those characteristics constitute the basis against which to evaluate H2.  
 
The final step of the analysis considers the case of the Covid-19 pandemic and crisis and recovery response, 
focusing on the unarguably most innovative element in the EU integration toolbox: Next Generation EU. On 
this account scoring is twofold: against the past and the future. The scoreboard criteria allow for a systematic 
assessment of the extent to which weaknesses of the current governance framework remain within the new 
instrument of Next Generation EU (H1). Remaining gaps within the shortcomings of the EMU infrastructure 
against the ideal type(s) of EU economic integration offer an indication of the essential (structural) ambition 
for future reform, against which the narrative of  Covid-19 and Next Generation EU as a critical juncture may 






1 The word clouds presented in the article are generated through wordclouds.com which allows for straightforward graphical 











4.1 Coding the EMU weaknesses 
 
The initial Scopus search after the preliminary screening of irrelevant results presented 2000 entries, which 
were coded to either exclude or select articles as relevant to weaknesses and/or reform proposals for EMU. 
The abstract, when available and sufficiently informative, or a brief review of the key sections of the paper 
informed a qualitative text analysis resulting in multiple tags associated with each of the selected articles. For 
each area, the resulting tags were exported and after data cleaning and merging subjected to frequency analysis 
to determine the main themes uncovered by the literature.  
 
For what concerns the weaknesses of the current EU economic governance framework, the process resulted 
in 605 tags which are visually represented in the word cloud displayed in Figure 1 below. The frequency 
analysis and hierarchical linkages across themes informed a classification into four macro areas within which 
further sub-topics are clustered. In the order of pervasiveness within the literature the areas are: the austerity 
paradigm and its effects; the core-periphery divergence; legitimacy and the incompleteness of EMU 
infrastructure. 
 
Figure 1 - Wordcloud of EMU weaknesses review-tags. 
 
Source: own development 
 
Within the domain of the austerity paradigm one can distinguish across characteristics of EMU 
infrastructure, such as the reliance on fiscal and balanced budget rules and the focus on risk-reduction, and its 
effect. In this context, a major weakness is identified with pro-cyclical fiscal policy resulting from the 
supranational regulatory framework of the Stability and Growth Pact, which reached its apex in the Euro-crisis 
and especially in the Greek-crisis (e.g. Van Ewijk et al. 2015; Herzog 2018; Tamborini and Tomaselli 2020). 
Their mishandling, which ultimately required the introduction of new instruments and a reform of the 
supranational fiscal framework, is argued to have slowed and hindered the recovery worsening its social cost. 








associated with a rise in inequalities and the endangering of social-cohesion even beyond the period of the 
Great Recession (e.g. De La Porte and Heins 2015; Angelaki 2016; Perugini 2019). In this context, a concern 
is raised in relation to the limited scope for social priorities within EMU infrastructure even after the 
introduction of the European Semester and Social pillar (e.g. Pavolini 2015; Bongardt and Torres 2018; 
Costamagna 2018; Rasnača and Theodoropoulou 2020). Such dynamics are linked to the bottoming of trust in 
the European Union and the rise of Euroscepticism (e.g. Bergbauer et al. 2020; Moreira Ramalho 2020; Prosser 
2020).  
 
A second major design flaw of the framework lies in its scope and scale resulting in a problematic core-
periphery divide and conflict. In this context, the heterogeneous nature of the Member States economies both 
at the Union and the Eurozone level is uncontested in the literature (e.g. Bongardt and Torres 2018; Cesaroni 
et al. 2019; Coudert et al. 2020; Terzi 2020). The asymmetries, especially within the Euro area, the failure of 
convergence and even the rise of divergence as a result of the Euro crisis are a major concern for the long term 
sustainability of EMU. In this context, fragmentation remains as well as substantial problems in some countries 
in relation to public debt (e.g Ferreiro 2015; Oeking 2015; Zaghini 2016; Baroncelli 2018; Bassi and Durand 
2018; Ederer and Reschenhofer 2018). At the same time the dual nature of the regulatory framework for 
countries within and outside of the Euro area and the Fiscal Compact creates the scope for differentials in the 
extent of integration with the EMU. On the instruments side, the lack of effective stabilisers such as in the 
form of EUBS or other forms of transfers is highlighted as a problematic gap in the light of the emerged 
divergencies, as well as is the absence of forms of fiscal mutualisation (e.g. De Grauwe et al. 2018; Terzi 
2020).   
 
Considering the broad issue of legitimacy four sub-themes emerge. Firstly, in relation to sovereignty, the 
institutional design limits fiscal sovereignty at the national level binding it to the SGP constraints, without 
substituting it with a supranational equivalent (Howarth and Verdun 2020). Along this line fits the additional 
interference with fiscal policy choices at the core of national sovereignty of the European Semester, albeit with 
limited enforcement mechanisms (e.g Dawson 2018; Tkalec 2019). One of the key (monetary) instruments in 
getting through the Euro-crisis, the Out-of-Mandate-Transactions (OMT) together with the Public Sector 
Purchase Programme (PSPP) commenced in 2015, is another problematic element within the legitimacy 
stream, a centre of conflicts between national and supranational sovereignty caught in the struggle between 
national - and in particular the German - constitutional courts and the ECJ (e.g. Lombardo 2015; Mody 2015; 
Grund and Grle 2016; Pennesi 2016;  Snell 2016; Tridimas and Xanthoulis 2016; Occhino 2017; Bröhmer 
2019; Menéndez 2019; Van Der Sluis 2019). An additional critical element regards the (intergovernmental) 
nature of the decision-making process and the parallel political divisions (e.g. Fabbrini 2016; Maris and Sklias 
2016; Martínez Alarcón and Lagos Rodríguez 2017; Dawson 2018; Tkalec 2019; Wasserfallen et al. 2019; 
Schild 2020). Within the arena of democracy, parliamentary-oversight emerges as a weak point in multiple 
contexts, both at the supranational level and at that of national parliaments (e.g. Auel and Höing 2015; Maatsch 
2016; Lord 2017; De Wilde and Raunio 2018; Fromage 2018; Fromage and van den Brink 2018; Tesche 2019; 
Dawson and Maricut-Akbik 2020; Fernández and de Vidales 2020; Genovese and Schneider 2020; Piattoni 
2020). The democratic deficit is especially problematic within extra-treaty instruments and institutions such 
the EFSF and ESM together with the Eurogroup (e.g. De Witte 2015; Fabbrini 2016; Louis 2016; Gocaj and 
Meunier 2016; Tesche 2019; Abels 2020).  
 
The final stream of weaknesses relates to the incompleteness of EMU. The limits of the unbalanced 








Great Recession and Euro crisis (e.g. Andor, 2017; Donnelly 2018; Ederer and Reschenhofer 2018; Foglia et 
al. 2018). In this context the ECB proved essential in faring the crisis highlighting the problematic monetary-
dominance within the EMU together with the lack of appropriate fiscal instruments (e.g. Van Der Heijden et 
al. 2018; Constâncio 2020).  The absence of fiscal integration through cross-country transfers allowing for risk 
sharing and stabilisation is argued to be a major drawback of the institutional framework. In this context, some 
form of fiscal federalism is highlighted as a necessity to overcome incompleteness through a common sizeable 
(Eurozone) budget and debt (e.g. Bibow 2016; Louis 2016; Lionello 2017; Mathieu and Sterdyniak 2019; 
Schooller 2020; Terzi 2020).   
 
4.2 Reform proposals: the ideal type(s) of EU economic governance 
  
A parallel methodological approach yields 78 review-tags relating to EMU reform, depicted according to 
their relative frequencies in Figure 2 below. Three broad typologies of keywords can be distinguished. Firstly, 
several authors call for the establishment of a Fiscal, Social and Political Union, in that respective ranking of 
frequency. The remaining entries fit into two groups: general necessary characteristics of the reformed EMU 
and specific measure proposals. Among the latter, four measures are proposed, in this order of frequency: 
Eurobonds, EUBS, an Eurozone budget and the establishment of an EU finance minister. A SWOT analysis 
allows for a comparative appraisal of the four options, pinpointing both communal ideal elements and trade-
offs. A brief overview of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the four policy instruments is 
outlined in Table 1. 
Among the general characteristics of a well-functioning EMU, the most common element highlighted is 
some  level of federal institutional organisation, allowing for effective stabilisation and convergence, through 
transfers, risk-sharing mechanisms and more in general transnational solidarity.  This elements addressed the 
completion of EMU and the rebalancing of the original sin of its fiscal-monetary asymmetries, creating the 
instruments to foster convergence rather than core-periphery divergence over time within the framework of an 
effective decision-making not hindered by intergovernmental dynamics and falling under full parliamentary 
scrutiny, thus in a position to perform well both in terms of input and output legitimacy. Those characteristics 
are to a varied extent embedded in all of the four proposed measures assessed through the SWAT analysis and 
can offer general guidance in what the ideal type(s) of EU economic governance should entail. As such, as 
necessary conditions for a well-functioning EMU over time, they offer a broad benchmark against which to 
assess progress and outstanding gaps of Next Generation EU along with the need to enact further ambitious 
structural reforms. 
 
4.3 Does Next Generation EU overcome the EMU shortcomings? 
 
The lessons from the Euro crisis suggest that the austerity paradigm, the intergovernmental decision-making 
in the context of politically divisive choices and diverging national interests, together with the lack of effective 
tools for crisis-management, stabilisation and common fiscal intervention contributed to a worsening of the 
outcomes of the Great Recession and ensuing sovereign debt crisis. The largely unchanged EMU architecture 
after the 2011 reforms to the EU economic governance framework, as evidenced from the persistent 
weaknesses emerged from the literature review covering the post-crisis years does not fare well for the crisis-
readiness of the Union. At the same time, the first line of defence for the European economies fell once again 
on the ECB shoulders with the initial Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) of 750 billion euros 









Table 1 - SWOT analysis of policy instruments for EMU reform 
 Strenghts Weaknesses Opportunities Threats 
Eurobonds2 Fiscal coordination 
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Source: Own elaboration 
 
Figure 2 - Wordcloud of EMU weaknesses review-tags. 
 











2 Sources: Pisani-Ferry 2016; Corsetti et al. 2019; Nicoli 2019; Hodson 2020 
3 Sources: Hebous and Weichenrieder 2016; Davis et al. 2017; Farvaque and Huart 2018; Moyen et al. 2019 
4 Sources: Bibow 2016; Louis 2016; Lionello 2017; Mathieu and Sterdyniak 2019; Schooller 2020; Terzi 2020 








EMU, long overdue for governance revision, entered the pandemic crisis in precarious shape and with 
substantial political division on the outlook for European integration ahead of the postponed Conference on 
the future of Europe. The initial EU response was - as expected - partial, limited and divisive, in the absence 
of the appropriate policy instrument requiring alike in the Euro-crisis emergency tools to fare the 
unprecedented shock to European economies and societies. Absent a substantial common fiscal power, the 
only initial path was to free national budgetary powers from the restraints of the Pact with the invocation of 
the general escape clause, together with the temporary weakening of the state aid regulation (C/2020/1863; 
EUCO 2020). Given the heavy legacy of the Great Recession leaving the Southern Member States with further 
weakened economies and capabilities of intervention – even in key arenas such as health – a primarily national 
response raises problematic concerns. Such countries, in parallel more heavily impacted by the first wave of 
the pandemic, had limited fiscal spaces to respond, under the sword of Damocles of high public debts, 
nevertheless further skyrocketing as a result of Covid-19 stimulus packages. If the monetary intervention, alike 
in the heat of the Eurozone crisis, eased some of the pressure and provided a protective umbrella, it is 
undeniable that countries in the core and periphery faced the pandemic under very different circumstances and 
abilities for autonomous intervention.   
 
From such a perspective, common action at the European level appears as an essential need in  mitigating 
such deeply entrenched divergent paths and support a balanced and inclusive reconstruction. This is an 
especially strong argument for common borrowing, which allows to further support weaker Member States 
while lessening the burden of the recovery on their balance sheets, in the context of a disaster-like event such 
as the pandemic. Together with SURE, Next Generation EU, not immune from fierce intergovernmental 
contestation regarding its nature and scale, represents an innovative breaking point with respect to the status 
quo. Setting aside initially their temporary nature, it remains to be seen the extent to which NGEU fully or 
partially overcomes the weaknesses driving the main criticism to EMU along the four literature-driven 
dimensions of the scoreboard.  
 
(i) Austerity. At face value, one may consider NGEU as breaking away from the fiscal restraint 
prioritisation within EMU, especially given the invocation of the general escape clause. The discourse has in 
part shifted, not only in political circles – notably in the accommodating position of Germany – but also within 
the supranational institutions. That is especially the case for the Commission, traditionally one of the strong 
advocate for discipline and austerity, fully on board with solidarity driven common action. The 750 billion 
plan, 672.5 of which foreseen through the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF), represents undoubtedly an 
unprecedented joint EU level firepower in support of the Member States (Council 2020). At the same time, the 
outcome was not uncontested, taking a multitude of six summits from March to July even under increasing 
pressure to deliver and deteriorating public support in the most affected Member States  (Bremer and Genschel 
2020). In this context the political debate on the nature of the Recovery Plan remained divisive and contested. 
The hawks leaded by Netherlands long dragged their feet against any form of risk-sharing and transnational 
solidarity opposing any form of grants and favouring instruments such as the ESM (Fabbrini 2020). That is to 
say that compromise was far from straightforward even in the face of a symmetric exogenous crisis and a 
dramatic tragedy shaking the continent where hardly any blame could be assigned to the worst hit countries 
(Botta et al. 2020; Sabat et al. 2020). The compromise resulted nonetheless in a watering down of the 
Commission proposal enhancing the role of loans compared to grants. A cheaper route to financing additional 
debt loans do not go in the direction of lifting the reconstruction from the burden and constraints of the legacy 
of precarious public finances. Nor they fully respond to the need for transnational solidarity, finding moreover 








quite limited appetite from the Member States, with only Italy in its initial plan leveraging the loans within the 
RFF. The underlying political divide within the Member States is thus alive and well and the lost battle of 
NGEU may further motivate the frugal countries war against transnational solidarity hindering any transition 
toward permanent risk-sharing mechanism in the context of the Conference on the future of Europe.  
 
(ii) Core-periphery. The Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated the core-periphery divide. The austerity 
weakened healthcare system in the worst hit southern countries struggled to keep up with the pandemic crisis 
(Ceron et al. 2020). At the same time, the initial national delegated response put in a particularly tough spot 
the same subgroup of Member States, with a more limited fiscal capacity to tackle the crisis and recovery, 
further increasing the divergence between core and periphery (Ceron et al. 2020; Schularick et al. 2020). In 
this context, Next Generation EU attempts to rebalance the game as the allocation key is based on pre-2020 
unemployment levels and GDP loss during the pandemic (EUCO 2020b). The sharp gap between the 
frontrunners in the domestic recovery efforts - and especially Germany - and periphery countries such as Italy 
and Spain calls into questions whether the temporary measures of NGEU will be sufficient to reverse the long 
standing trend (Ceron et al. 2020). Such a pattern indeed is far from an extraordinary circumstance created by 
the pandemic but rather a deep structural cleavage ingrained in the mechanism of EMU based heavily on risk-
reduction and fiscal discipline. The framework to these days remains unchanged with NGEU a temporary side-
act of EU economic governance. Hence any permanent solution to unbalances would require a likewise 
structural long-term mechanism for solidarity, for which as highlighted above a consensus has far from 
emerged so far (e.g. Howarth and Quaglia 2021; Howarth and Schild 2021; Schoeller and Karlsson 2021). 
 
(iii) Legitimacy. Some of the key critical aspects within this domain refer to the absence to a supranational 
compensation to the national limitation to fiscal sovereignty, the lack of output legitimacy derived from the 
ineffective intergovernmental decision-making and the lacking input legitimacy in view of non far-reaching 
involvement of national and especially EU level parliamentary oversight within several aspects of the EU 
economic governance. Little is changed within the domain through NGEU. Short of Treaty changes the 
underlying fiscal-monetary asymmetries remain unscathed (De Grauwe 2018; Rossolillo 2018). Rather, the 
introduction of minimal common fiscal space, although temporary and purposed for the pandemic recovery 
may further strain the unfit intergovernmental EMU architecture (Jones et al. 2016; Ceron et al. 2020; Fabbrini 
2020; Landais 2020). Additionally, if the European Parliament does play a role in the establishment of the 
Recovery and Resilience Facility (2020/014(COD)), the same is not the case when it comes to the Council-
centric approval of National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs) within NGEU (EUCO 2020b). 
Moreover, building on the pre-existing teethless process of the Semester while warranting to the Commission 
and Council sharp conditionality within the context of the NRRPs enhance the power of scrutiny at the EU 
level  far into the future as the disbursement of NGEU are scheduled to peak only in 2024. The implication is 
a dangerous outlook for national budgetary dynamics if at the end of the immediate aftermath of the pandemic 
the course deviating from austerity is reversed, in the context of heightened debts especially in the periphery. 
 
(iv)  Completeness. Has the monetary dominance and lack of appropriate stabilisation and solidarity 
mechanisms within EMU been overcome? The Covid-19 crisis proved the inadequacy of the EU budgetary 
instruments not only in their scale but also for flexibility and timing (Fabbrini 2020). The monetary channel 
remains the only immediate response at the supranational level even after the deployment of NGEU, which 
will see its initial implementation with the negotiation of the NRRPs over a year after the outbreak and with 
further delays concentrating disbursement far from in the immediate post-pandemic reconstruction. 
Nevertheless, an undeniable first seed is advanced with NGEU in relation to a common fiscal capacity. Nearly 








a large-scale common borrowing at the EU level (Council 2020). However, the temporary nature of NGEU, a 
key condition for the political feasibility of the measure, falls short of the introduction of an adequately sized 










Both during the sovereign debt crisis and the pandemic, Member States have been the forefront towards 
hurdles created by such difficult contingencies. Nation states with their democratic and fully legitimate 
institutions, policy and decision-remain the cornerstone of political order even within the EU, albeit the failures 
to provide effective answers (e.g. in the Euro crisis) have shaken the credibility and trust of both levels of 
governments   (Morgan & Orloff, 2016; Jacobsson et al. 2015; King & Le Galés, 2017; Jackson, 2007). Indeed, 
the supranational character of the EMU, and transnational nature of the pandemic require appropriate 
supranational responses. As often happened during the history of the EU (Rapone, 2004), crises determined 
leaps forward in the integration process. NGEU does not yet constitute such leap but rather better aligns with 
in-crisis piecemeal solutions we have witnessed in the past (Howarth and Quaglia 2021). 
 
4.4 Evaluating the gaps of Next Generation EU against the EMU ideal type(s) 
 
A necessary condition for the ideal type(s) of EU economic governance emerged earlier in the section 
revolves around the institutional dimension. Departing from the instruments and rule-based approach of the 
SGP, what EMU needs is a fully fledged institutional framework performing well in terms of legitimacy and 
accountability. Reforms falling short of such institutional improvements can only partially overcome the 
weaknesses of the current framework towards a well-functioning and sustainable EMU. The common trait of 
reform proposals satisfying the legitimacy criteria is Treaty reform, without which substantial progress cannot 
occur within this domain. For the distribution of fiscal powers to shift away from the national level without an 
overt rethinking of the governance architecture but rather through indirect constraints of the supranational 
surveillance framework is a rehashing of the same problematic approach. That is the case of NGEU integrated 
into the Semester, strengthening the hand of the EU level against national budget through the conditionality 
associated with the NRRPs. As such Next Generation EU falls well short of the EMU ideal type(s) within this 
domain, suggesting further reform will be needed down the line. 
 
A second question relates to whether the measure does enough for long term convergence. Firstly, while 
broad joint priorities such as investment towards a digital and green recovery are foreseen by NGEU (EUCO 
2020b), the measure is quite far from a fully-fledged common economic policy with the sensitivity and 
flexibility required for quick adjustment to the cycle and emerging challenges. Rather, in continuity with the 
overarching philosophy of the SGP fiscal choices largely remain in the hands of the Member States through 
the NRRPs subject to EU level (Council) approval.  In addition, the pandemic worsened core-periphery 
divergence through initial national responses (Ceron et al. 2021), its if not reversal at least effective mitigation 
through NGEU is far from a given. At the same times, if there is some consensus at the institutional level and 
among the big Member States of the need to support weaker and worst hit Southern economies, the NRRPs 
primary focus on investment and growth – albeit with the focus on a green and digital recovery, complemented 
to some extent by social concerns – along with their conditionality on structural reforms are largely in 
continuity with the past.  
 
A linked final multifaceted dimension in which NGEU performance aligns is risk-sharing, stabilisation and 
(transnational) solidarity at the scale needed to face the current crisis and serve the needs of the EMU. 
Negotiations have shown how there is limited appetite for transnational solidarity, especially in countries long 
opposed to any form of risk-sharing and transfers. Their favoured approach remains risk-mitigation, objecting 
to grants in favour of the ESM, echoing the Euro crisis. Such diffidence remained within the international 
political debate even in the face of the tragedy that run havoc through the European economies and societies 








some form of solidarity in the wake of a natural disaster like pandemic crisis, to some extent joining the public 
outrage from southern countries at the initial utter refusal of any form of support to the worst hit Member 
States by the political leaders from countries such as the Netherlands (Bremer and Genschel 2020). However, 
solidarity support only applies to the (exogenous) crisis-driven temporary measures, politically feasible exactly 
because of such characteristics, while the same openness does not extend even to public debt contracted as a 
direct result of the Covid-19 pandemic (Bremer and Genschel 2020). The derived post-crisis outlook appears 
quite dire along with the solidarity achievements of the NGEU if one considers that the little over 300 billions 
of grants barely exceed one half of the national recovery spending of Germany (Ceron et al. 2020). Also, along 
this dimension the achievements of NGEU – in the context of an unmatchable favourable political context for 
transnational solidarity – is far from ideal, structural or permanent. 
 
5. Discussion of results 
 
The systematic review covering over 2000 articles devoted to EMU within the last five years uncovered 
broad consensus on the incomplete and precarious nature the architecture and the consequent dire need to 
complete the EU economic governance infrastructure toward a fiscal, political or social union of sorts. 
Agreement stops in moving onto how to fix EMU, together with the optimal direction of the future European 
integration, with divergent opinion on the details of the underlying causes of failure in terms of input and 
output legitimacy and how to overcome them. Within this framework the failure of EU economic governance 
in managing the euro crisis is uncontested, with the lack of crisis-management and quick responsive (fiscal) 
instruments extending to the Covid-19 pandemic. After the storm of 2020, monetary dominance remains a key 
feature of EMU, with the ECB just as essential as in the Euro crisis in allowing for a swift and large-scale 
defence and support of the Member States and their economies. However, absent an appropriate fiscal 
response, monetary intervention with Quantitative Easing or now with the PEPP is only a short-term palliative 
buying some extra time for an adequate (political) solution (Cafaro 2020). The state of the EU economic 
governance coming into the pandemic crisis is a testament to how the space warranted by the ECB shield was 
wasted away without addressing the institutional weaknesses and original design flaws. A parallel may connect 
the PEPP commenced by the ECB in March (ECB 2020) with the month-long delays in negotiations toward 
NGEU even in the midst of the worst tragedy for the old continent since the end of WWII.   
 
The unprecedented scale of the crisis further exacerbated and brought to the centre stage the weaknesses of 
EMU, subjecting the framework to a second brutal (pandemic) crash test, whose outcome is yet to fully unfold. 
A governance framework and the legacy of austerity with well-established diverging implication for the core 
and periphery of the Eurozone constituted a fragility in the pandemic bound to further exacerbate gaps across 
the Member States (Camous and Claeys 2020; Celi et al. 2020). Even at this preliminary stage, however, results 
confirm H1 showing how the pandemic response toolset of NGEU still presents many of the pre-existing 
weaknesses in terms of lack of support for social-cohesion, core periphery divergence and more in general lack 
of effective solidarity and risk sharing, while also limited in the input and output legitimacy. The strains of the 
Covid-induced recession is only bound to accentuate such problems evidencing the need for further integration. 
EMU own resources anti-cyclical tools emerged as a priority and inescapable necessity in supporting Eurozone 
Member States economies. Covid-19 – and the crisis linked tolerance for solidarity – opens a window of 
opportunity for the much needed structural reforms, which in confirming H2 would however require a deep 









The results of the analysis indicate that NGEU retains across the (score)board much of the weaknesses of 
EMU. The reality continues to fall substantially short of the ideal for EU economic governance, in light of the 
temporary nature of the measures and its embedding within the current (lacking) institutional framework whose 
substantial improvement would require Treaty reform. In this context, locating the analysis within the 
academic EMU reform debate indicates we are from fully-fledged (federal) integration. Such leap cannot take 
place within the framework of intergovernmental decision-making, which does not offers an appropriate 
setting for mitigating divergent national interests into common European priorities (De Grauwe 2018; Booth 
et al. 2020). Priorities that must be in the position to (quickly) spur into action through an own-resources-
founded joint fiscal space fully legitimised by parliamentary oversight (Booth et al. 2020; Rossolillo 2018). 
Nothing short of that would likely prove adequate in fostering the common EU action required to address the 
challenge of the pandemic reconstruction effort (Bachtrögler-Unger 2020).  
 
As evidenced by a lack of consensus even within the academic debate on the way forward, the question 
remains of how to get to such outcome, given that the political feasibility of the much less ambitious temporary 
measures under Next Generation EU – in the midst of a global pandemic – have been far from straightforward 
and uncontested. At the same time, the negotiation process, harder than ever in recent history, revealed how 
vetoes could not prevent willing Member States making necessary improvements to EMU governance. The 
tolerance for a continuation of austerity driven approaches is limited in the renewed context. So was the outrage 
at the attempts to block even pandemic solidarity. Unlike in the Euro crisis, no national blame can be assigned 
to the heavy costs of the outbreak, hence strongly backing on the economic level and facilitating the political 
feasibility of risk-sharing. Indeed, the Next Generation EU package determined a once-in-lifetime opportunity 
to strengthen EMU. However, the window of opportunity of such symmetrical existential crisis will fast close, 
with the fading of any facilitation of moves toward structural European solidarity (Landais, 2020). Under such 
premises findings contribute the urgency of taking stock of the true (limited and temporary) progress of NGEU, 
which so far rather than an overarching paradigm shift represent a temporary emergency stop-gap which does 
not address the unescapable needs for further structural and permanent integration. The urgency is further 
reinforced by the current political context and the ongoing debate on the future of integration in the Context 
of the Conference of the Future of Europe bound to carve a deep mark in the prognosis for the EMU for many 
years to come. 
 
Against such a backdrop, a divisive debate has likewise emerged in the evaluation of pandemic EU 
responses as a Hamiltonian moment reneging on past austerity-driven mismanagement (e.g. Benjamin 2020; 
Ladi and Tsarouhas 2020; Schmidt 2020; Wolff and Ladi 2020) or rather deriving comparisons with the failing-
forward process characterising the Eurocrisis (e.g. Ceron et al. 2020, 2021; Lionello 2020; Jones et al. 2021, 
Howarth and Schild 2021; Howarth and Quaglia 2021). In this context, some have gone as far as arguing for 
the superiority of EU (limited) competences in practice in terms of effective pandemic management even 
against the benchmark of a fully-fledged federation such as the US (Rhodes 2021). Results, building on a 
systematic benchmarking against the extant literature and derived limits of the current governance framework, 




The Pandemic and the challenge of the recovery hard pressed the Member States toward enhancing the 
deeply lacking current European economic governance framework. Such dramatic premises of unprecedented 








transnational solidarity unimaginable before the Covid-19 outbreak. Nevertheless, the analysis evidences that 
the long awaited comprehensive reforms to bring EMU out of the impasse of its incomplete design are largely 
yet to come. The urgency of reforms is reinforced by the pandemic: improving legitimacy and effectiveness of 
EMU is time sensitive to fully cope with the existential challenge of the recovery equipping the Eurozone with 
the necessary common (budgetary) tools to invest in rebuilding European economies. Only if the window of 
opportunity of the pandemic is effectively exploited into fully-fledged structural treaty reform will we be in 
the right to consider Covid-19 as a turning point in the history of EMU.  
 
In this context, the analysis contributes to the academic debate on the overall and (lacking) crisis-readiness 
fitness of EMU. The findings map the pandemic response-lead progress of Next Generation EU uncovering 
how fundamental asymmetries and deep design flaws cannot be addressed through a temporary marginal 
emergency mechanism. In parallel, findings highlight implications of Covid-19 for EU economic governance 
evidencing weaknesses and further reform needs. The analytical approach allows manifesting how Next 
Generation EU emergency measures fail to address structural asymmetries and shortcomings of EMU, calling 
for far reaching institutional (and Treaty) reform. With insurmountable gaps toward the ideal type of economic 
governance unavoidable under the current institutional framework within which NGEU is collocated, 
permanent structural rethinking of EMU infrastructure is the only way out of permanent crisis to which 
intergovernmental minimal compromise solutions can barely put a dent (Jones et al. 2016).  
 
NGEU negotiations paralleled the inner nature of the EU diplomatic context. Ongoing cleavages within the 
EU Member States evidence they do not align on values for key policies and, probably, for integration 
prospects. That has happened for other conflictual issues - e.g. Migration; Sovereign Debt Crisis (King & Le 
Gales 2017; Jacquot and Vitale 2014). Nevertheless, the political salience, the German Semester, the role of 
the European Commission and the pivotal willingness provided by the ‘big four’ (Spain, Germany, Italy and 
France) supported the creation of a new financial instrument. Regardless, path-breaking away from the past – 
e.g. of austerity driven policies – while facilitated by the top-down and bottom-up pressure of the crisis is, 
however, still limited in time and scope. The temporariness of NGEU within and unchanged architecture 
determines, more than ever, the impelling necessity for Treaty reform, providing formal EU institutions, 
legitimacy and effectiveness, alike for fiscal power within Nation-States. Only such a reform could determine 
effective solidarity mechanisms within the EU, overcoming current imbalances, assigning accountable 
competences in key supranational policies (Rossolillo, 2010). At the same time, the political sustainability of 
such prospects is at best unclear. Indeed, the appetitive of the country whose position had been deemed crucial 
for the compromise leading to NGEU – Germany – for a permanent ‘transfer union’ is limited. Conversely 
many have highlighted the crisis-driven contextual nature of the positioning of the country, which does not 
amount to a permanent shift in preferences toward integration (e.g. De La Porte and Jensen 2021; Howarth 
and Schild 2021; Schoeller and Karlsson 2021). Divisions are confirmed by the ongoing debate on the future 
of the SGP, at the core of key distortions within EMU, while at the same time far less of an ambitious and 
controversial element compared to the development of a solidarity-based fully-fledged federal fiscal union.  
 
Against this background, recent innovation-defined pathway of Next Generation EU – setting the direction 
of further integration while evidencing the limited progress achieved even under the utmost pressure to deliver 
– provides insights on the reform gaps yet to be filled and the political challenges undermining their feasibility.  
In doing so the analysis evidences the high stakes of the ongoing Conference of the future of Europe: to call 
the Covid-19 induce evolution a success would require an ambitious (federal) agenda extending well beyond 








challenge of enacting convergence against the legacy of the pandemic, exacerbating the core-periphery divide 
fuelled by the Eurocrisis (Ceron et al. 2021). Beyond policy implications, conclusions contributes to the 
spurring debate on the assessment of the EU Covid-19 response and governance evolution. Specifically, while 
recognising the steps forwards at the basis of revolutionary claims surrounding NGEU (e.g. Ladi and Tsarouhas  
2020; Wolff and Ladi 2020; Schmidt 2020; Rhodes, 2021), findings support a cautious-to-negative assessment 
of the emergency driven measures (e.g. Ceron et al. 2020, 2021; Lionello 2020; Howarth and Quaglia 2021) 
in the absence of further overarching reform of EU economic governance. Institutional shortcomings, 
incomplete solutions and detrimental intergovernmental mechanism and divisions highlighted have been 
attributed to the EU common fiscal response (e.g. Ceron et al. 2020, 2021; Lionello 2020; De La Porte and 
Jenssen 2021; Howath and Quaglia 2021). The score boarding – in line with such positions – provides a 
systematic linkage between the limits of NGEU deeply ingrained in the structure of EMU as well-established 
with half a decade of literature of the topic. An exercise of extensive value against the pressure of the reform 
of the SGP in the context of the expiration of the general escape clause, which absent institutional rethinking 
would end the cease fire of the current governance framework against national fiscal and social policies, as 
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